Selfhood is linked to brain processes that enable the experience of a person as a distinct entity, capable of agency. This framework naturally incorporates a continuum of both non-conscious and conscious self-related information processing, and includes a hierarchy of components, such as awareness of existence (core self), embodied self (sentience), executive self (agency/volition), and various other higher-order cognitive processes. Consciousness relates to, but is not congruent, with selfhood; understanding the processes required for selfhood can explain the partial consciousness seen in anaesthesia. Functional-brain-imaging and electroencephalographic studies in sleep and general anaesthesia have shown differential effects of anaesthetic drugs on various specific self-related functional brain networks. In particular, drug-induced selective impairment of anterior insula function suggests there might be a crucial difference between anaesthesia and natural sleep when it comes to the salience network. With increasing concentrations of anaesthetics, it is not uncommon for patients to become depersonalised (i.e. to lose sentience and agency), but retain many higher-order functions and a disembodied self-awareness, until quite high concentrations are reached. In this respect, general anaesthesia differs significantly from physiological sleep, where it appears that loss of agency and sentience parallels, or lags behind, the decrease in self-awareness. Interestingly, connectivity within the posterior brain regions is maintained even to quite high concentrations of anaesthetics, potentially representing a pathognomonic marker of the core self that possibly is involved in maintaining a reduced energy state of homeostasis.
potential mental states is presented in Table 1 . Patients' postoperative reports of intraoperative experiences [i.e. awareness with recall (AWR)] typically involve auditory and somatosensory perception, and, more rarely, sensations of disembodiment, with widely varying degrees of pain perception, ranging from the most extreme distress to a state of total analgesia and disinterest. 2 Additional evidence for incomplete unconsciousness is provided by the occurrence of implicit memory formation 3 and intraoperative dreaming. 4 Intraoperative wakefulness may be determined by a volitional response to a command, which can be seen in either non-paralysed patients or during an isolated forearm test (IFT). Typically, these patients are in a passive and an apparently pain-free state, but do not show spontaneous motor responses. This depersonalised state may be characterised by a feeling of detachment from the surroundings and an inability to attach appropriate significance to sensations. 5 We term this state of undistressed wakefulness as 'anaesthetic depersonalisation', and early data from neuroimaging studies show a functional-brain-imaging signature consonant with a pattern of interoception suppression (as described in more detail later), which fits with very recent concepts put forward by Craig. 6 Apart from the presence or absence of amnesia, there is a large amount of overlap between AWR and intraoperative wakefulness reports. Therefore, in this perspective paper, we adopt a simplified pragmatic classification of clinical descriptors: (i) awake distressed; (ii) undistressed wakefulness/ depersonalisation; (iii) dreaming and (iv) a state of oblivion. We also assume thatdaround the point of loss of behavioural responsiveness to verbal commanddthe brain is in a labile, lightly anaesthetised state on the cusp of wakefulness, sometimes responding to a sufficiently salient command (such as the patient's name) and sometimes failing to respond. We assume this state is often similar to that seen when there is a positive volitional response in an IFT. The question arises: 'What are the active neurobiological processes that subserve or facilitate this "tipping point" to awareness?' and conversely 'What processes are switched off or dampened in this "twilight zone" around the point of ceasing to respond?' Why introduce the concept of selfhood rather than consciousness?
In 1847, Oliver Wendell Holmes first suggested we use the word 'anaesthesia' to describe the state of surgical patients under the influence of ether. By the use of this word, he explicitly defined the patients as having 'loss of perception/ sensation', not 'loss of consciousness'. However, discussion about the central-nervous-system effects of general anaesthesia invariably turns on the effects of these drugs on consciousness, by which we usually mean 'phenomenological consciousness', commonly defined as a subjective experience of awareness. It has been proposed that a continuum of consciousness can be captured by describing gradations in: (i) level of consciousness (i.e. rousability for increasing noxious stimuli); and (ii) content of consciousness (complexity of subjective experience). The problem with this approach is that it is largely derived from brain-injury studies, 7 and it is often awkward to fit the particular varieties of anaesthesia drug experience into this schema. Although selfhood is intimately interwoven with consciousness, we would suggest that the framework of selfhood might provide taxonomic precision that could facilitate the understanding of anaesthesia. As described later, it is concerned with feelings that naturally incorporate a continuum of both non-conscious and conscious self-related information processing, and there is a wealth of papers linking the aspects of selfhood to specific neuroimaging patterns. Selfhood has been defined in many different ways, but as an umbrella term, it describes the variety of brain processes that underly the experience of a person as a distinct entity capable of self-control and agency. There is a large nonanaesthetic literature suggesting that selfhood can be deconstructed into a number of partially independent components: (i) awareness of existence (core self); (ii) embodied self (sentience/feeling); (iii) executive self (agency/volition); (iv) various other higher-order cognitive processes (including meta-cognition/meta-awareness); and (v) the knowledge of our autobiographical and social selves (narrative). (See Fig. 1 and brief definitions in Table 2 ).
Recently, there has been a vigorous functional-brainimaging research effort to delineate the various brain regions associated with (and perhaps necessary for) aspects of selfrepresentation.
8e13 Importantly, the different aspects of selfhood have been shown to consistently correlate with steady-state activity and connectivity in the major large-scale cortical functional networks, 14 in particular: (i) the anterior and posterior medial cortical regions of the default mode network (DMN) 15, 16 ; (ii) the lateral fronto-parietal cortical regions included in the executive control network (ECN); and (iii) the anterior cingulate cortex and insulae that form the major nodes of the salience network (SN). 17 The overlap between this body of work and that of functional brain imaging in sleep and general anaesthesia allows a natural explanation of partial selfhood in terms of the differential effects of anaesthetic drugs on activity in various specific brain regions that account for the various reported states of partial consciousness. Our proposed model is hierarchical, consisting of a core self onto which additional components of selfhood are accreted Conceptual model of selfhood and its application to general anaesthesia. In (A) a wakeful state, the core self is combined with narrative (i.e. memory and knowledge of our social and autobiographical selves), sentience (e.g. pain and emotiondfeelings), agency (e.g. volition and willful actions), and other higher-order components (e.g. metacognition/meta-awareness). With increasing levels of anaesthesia causing (B) a depersonalised state, these components of selfhood are disrupted, but a degree of conscious content remains, allowing positive cognitive responses to the IFT. At (C) deeper levels of anaesthesia, these selfhood components are reduced entirelydso that only the activity in the core self remains. IFT, isolated forearm test.
I've ever had'. 18 Based on such reports, it would seem that varying amounts of additional selfhood components may be present during anaesthesia. These reports are intriguing in light of Craig's 6 recent thinking about selfhood and interoception, where he put forward as an alternative to Descarte's classic, 'I think, therefore I am', an alternative: 'I feel, therefore I am or I feel that I am'. This begs the question: What is the relationship between salience, sentience, interoception, and awareness? We will explore the relationship of the previously defined components of selfhood to the altered brain activity observed during sleep and anaesthesia in the following sections. In Table 2 , we briefly summarise some neural correlates, identified from neuroimaging, that are associated with changes of selfhood complexity, behavioural, and EEG state.
Hierarchy of selves: the journey to oblivion and back to wakefulness
In recent years, there has been a plethora of functional-brainimaging and multi-electrode EEG studies describing the effects of general anaesthetics on steady-state or evoked regional brain activity. Broadly, these studies have shown that modest concentrations of propofol or sevoflurane produce changes in the activity and functional connectivity in the ECN and DMN similar to those seen in natural sleep. We note that, although the changes are most apparent in the large-scale cortical networks, it is quite likely that these changes may, in fact, be primarily driven by brainstem mechanisms, 19, 20 although the details of brainstemecortical interactions are a subject of ongoing discovery and debate. At around 0.5e0.7 minimum alveolar concentration (or equivalent propofol concentrations), anaesthetic drugs primarily affect the anterior (i.e. under EEG electrode Fp1) brain regions. There is a reduction in cortical responsiveness, and in anterior connectivity to the posterior cortex and thalamus.
21e25 Connectivity between the medial and lateral anterior brain regions and the medial posterior parietal regions (i.e. under electrode Pz) is lost around the time of loss of behavioural response to verbal command (Fig. 2) . In contrast, the connectivity within the posterior brain regions is maintained even to quite high concentrations of propofol (e.g. 4 mg ml
À1
).
Activity in this posterior medial parietal lobe [i.e. posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)] represents a potential pathognomonic marker of the core self. It is interesting to think of this network in the context of energy conservation and core homeostatic function. 6 This region remains active even during the EEG delta-wave-dominant brain activity that occurs in deep slowwave sleep and general anaesthesia. It can be seen as analogous to a 'pilot light' of selfhood, with studies suggesting that it is only extinguished once EEG burst suppression is achieved. 24, 26 Again, Craig 6 postulates that the progressive integration (or degradation in the case of anaesthesia) of all neural activitydfor the purpose of attaining optimal energy efficiency in the control of emotion and behaviourdproduces a 'representation of homeostatic salience as vivid feelings that are continuously changing in the immediate moment ("now") anddduring a discrete period of present timedprovides a cinemascopic representation of the sentient self, or the "material me" ', as he puts it. He suggests that the insula cortex within the mammalian brain is a place where interoception or the processing of bodily stimuli generates vivid perceptual feelings and, as such, a subjective image of the sentient self across time. Indeed, the very framework by which we think about how feelings and emotions are made from brain processing is being challenged in novel ways, 27 and we must include this new thinking into our understanding of how these experiences are degraded by anaesthetics. These observations suggest that a progressive loss of complexity of selfhood accompanies this 'posteriorisation' of brain connectivity. Conversely, it is possible to follow a canonical sequence of increasing complexity or maturation of selfhood during the process of emergence back from a deeply unconscious state to wakefulness, and link these states with a growing consistency of changes found in functional-brainimaging patterns, although work to date is still somewhat limited. 28e30 As depth of anaesthesia or sleep fades (measured by decreases in the amplitude of EEG slow waves), the anterior medial brain regions, such as the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), start to be recruited. This progressive recoupling of the anterior cortex with the PCC is associated with increasing complexity of selfhood and is manifested as more complex Definitions: core self ¼ primitive feeling of existence; narrative self ¼ ability to maintain a sense of continuity of selfhood through time (requires memory function); sentience ¼ the ability to link internal and external stimuli to self, and hence be able to feel them; higher order ¼ this includes a variety of selfrelated cognitive functions, such as metacognition (the ability to look on oneself as an object, or being aware that we are aware), self control, and morality; and agency ¼ the feeling of being able to act in a causal way in the world (linked to volition).
dreams (episodes of internally directed consciousness and some self-awareness). This dream content indicates that the self has been enlarged by some functional higher-order cognitive processes (metacognition) and the regaining of partial sentience (Fig. 1B) . As anaesthesia or sleep lightens further, the EEG typically shows smaller amplitude, faster waves. 31 The functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) signature is that of more active lateral fronto-parietal regions, which is manifested by the presence of self-monitoring and agency (i.e. lucid dreaming) anddwhen fully awakedattention to external salient events (i.e. connected consciousness and full selfhood).
Sleep studies agree with a number of fMRI studies done in wakeful subjects, which have identified the MPFC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), PCC, and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) as being strongly activated when the subject is showing conscious awareness of self.
8,11
Crucial role of the salience network/insulae in anaesthesia
The primary role of the SN, and more specifically the insulae, is to link bodily sensations (interoception) with the core self to ultimately drive decision making and behaviour (i.e. 'this perceptual sensation is happening to me'). 17,23,32e36 The SN, therefore, plays an important role in controlling and switching activity between the DMN and ECN. 17 Various lesions in different parts of the insula are associated with a wide range of neurological deficits related to sentience (neglect and anosognosia), agency (mutism and aboulia), and loss of risk aversity, loss of addiction, and loss of anxiety, 37 and sensory changes, such as pain (after posterior insula lesions).
38,39
There appears to be a crucial difference between anaesthesia and natural sleep when it comes to the SN. Propofolinduced depression of evoked activity in the dorsal anterior insula (and associated disrupted connectivity with the DLPFC and IPL) is associated with loss of volitional response to command, 23 occurring at only modest propofol concentrations of 2 mg ml
À1
, and before the characteristic slow waves of deep anaesthesia dominate the EEG. This exaggerated anaesthetic inhibition of the anterior insula cortex has been confirmed by others, 40, 41 and occurs alongside the inhibition of other subdivisions of the insula as part of the analgesic response to subanaesthetic ketamine 42 and remifentanil, 43, 44 and as part of the anxiolytic effects of midazolam during anticipation to pain. 45 In a direct comparison of the effects of propofol, dexmedetomidine, and natural sleep, Guldenmund and colleagues 46 reported that 'thalamic connectivity with key nodes of arousal and saliency detection networks was relatively preserved during N3 sleep and dexmedetomidine-induced unresponsiveness as compared to propofol'. On the basis of these observations, we suggest that the passive but marginally responsive (i.e. depersonalised) statedseen in patients who show a positive volitional response to an IFT, or who report non-distressing intraoperative eventsdis a state largely specific to general anaesthesia. These patients may be accurately described as retaining many of the higher-order components of selfhood, but have lost most of their agency and sentience as a result of drug-induced suppression of salience and sentience networks. This state is rare in natural sleep because SN function is relatively preserved in the absence of anaesthetic drugs; this is in agreement with the clinical observations of relatively easy arousal from natural sleep and dexmedetomidine sedation. We suggest that the anaesthetic depersonalised state is caused by the marked 'interoceptivesuppression' effect of general anaesthetic drugs. The reasons why the insula cortices, as core regions within these networks, should have heightened sensitivity to hypnotic drugs are unclear. We speculate that it is the result of localised inhibitory receptor subtypes or the result of network topography. The precise details of drug effects on the interactions between salience and sentience are not fully elucidated, and probably vary widely between patients and with different drug concentrations. Analgesic drugs clearly act at various levels to reduce salience aspects via their suppression of stimulusrelated activity and, therefore, making the stimuli less salient to the patient. In contrast, imaging work suggests much more complex effects with hypnotic drugs, which can also cause a dose-related but variable reduction in both salience and sentience (i.e. the linkage of stimuli to self and, hence, affective awareness/interoception). 23 Interestingly, a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies suggests two major functionaleanatomical subdivisions within the anterior insula relevant to the detection and processing of salient information: a dorsal region active during attention tasks and a ventral region active during affective experience. Touroutoglou and colleagues 47 examined the intrinsic functional connectivity using fMRI data from two independent samples of healthy awake adults to show that the stronger intrinsic connectivity within the right dorsal anterior insula network was associated with better performance on an attention task, whereas the stronger connectivity within the right ventral anterior insula network was associated with more intense affective experience. It is interesting to speculate how, around the point of loss of behavioural response, propofol specifically reduced the activity and connectivity of the dorsal anterior insula network, which would reduce the salience (attentional cognitive awareness) of the stimuli. At these propofol concentrations, the more preserved ventral insula function might still allow some sentience (affective experience).
Corollaries for monitoring and anaesthesia expectations
It is widely assumed that anaesthetic-induced loss of selfhood always follows the predictable 'quasi-sleep' trajectory (i.e. amnesia, followed by loss of self-control, then loss of selfawareness, and finally loss of volition and agency). On the basis of both clinical and functional-brain-imaging evidence, this assumption is not necessarily correct. The demonstrable existence of undistressed wakeful patients (i.e. IFT/AWR positive, but with interoception suppression) and the selective effects of light anaesthesia on the insula fMRI activity and connectivity strongly suggest that it is quite common for patients to lose sentience and agency early, but retain many higher-order functions and a disembodied self-awareness until quite high concentrations of anaesthetic are reached. In this respect, general anaesthesia differs significantly from physiological sleep, where loss of agency and sentience parallels, or lags behind, the decrease in self-awareness. This has relevance for both the conduct and philosophy of general anaesthesia, and the design of possible EEG monitors. If full unconsciousness is to be the primary target of general anaesthesia, then it would seem to be necessary to show significant anaesthetic-induced impairment of PCC connectivity 48 dor find a reliable anterior EEG correlate of this state. However, if prevention of patient distress is an acceptable therapeutic target for general anaesthesia, then achieving a state of interoceptive suppression, with or without amnesia, may be a sufficient goal. What are the EEG markers of interoceptive suppression? Although there is evidence from only limited numbers of formally assessed patients, it might be that anterior slow-wave saturation and the alphaedelta pattern (and parieto-frontal dys-synchrony) are sufficiently good biomarkers of loss of sentience and agency to preclude patient distress, but more work is needed.
Conclusion
We propose that the concept of selfhood provides a natural conceptual framework that can link the results of general anaesthetic-induced changes in functional neuroimaging of brain regions and networks to the various altered states of awareness seen in anaesthetised patients. The selfhood paradigm explicitly positions the idea of phenomenological consciousness as being embedded within, and influenced by, a number of subsidiary (usually unconscious) brain processesdsuch as sentience, salience, and agency.
